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common phenomenon. The judicialization of health policy in this form raises important questions about the
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Quebec (2005), in which the Supreme Court invalidated Quebec's prohibition against private insurance for
medical services provided through the public health care system. Among the questions this article explores
are: How do such cases get into the judicial system? Under what conditions are such claims likely to be
successful? What is the impact of such litigation on the broader policy environment?
Keywords
Health policy; Judicial review; Quebec; Canada
This special issue article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol44/iss2/1
"THE LAST LINE OF DEFENCE FOR
CITIZENS": LITIGATING PRIVATE
HEALTH INSURANCE IN CHAOULLI
V. 0 UEBEC©
CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI & ANTONIA MAIONI*
Litigating health care policy under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms has become an
increasingly common phenomenon. The judicialization
of health policy in this form raises important questions
about the general phenomenon of legal mobilization.
This article examines these questions in the context of
Chaoulli v. Ouebec (2005), in which the Supreme
Court invalidated Quebec's prohibition against private
insurance for medical services provided through the
public health care system. Among the questions this
article explores are: How do such cases get into the
judicial system? Under what conditions are such claims
likely to be successful? What is the impact of such
litigation on the broader policy environment?
Les litiges afffrents aux soins de sant6 en vertu de la
Charte canadienne des droits et libertes sont devenus
un phfnom~ne sans cesse croissant. La judicialisation
sous cette forme des politiques en mati~re de sant6
soul~ve d'importantes questions an sujet de ce
ph~nom~ne g6n6ral de mobilisation juridique. Le
pr6sent article examine ces questions dans le contexte
de la cause Chaoullic. OQdbec (2005), dans laquelle la
Cour supreme a invalid6 l'interdiction du Qu6bec en
cc qui conceme l'assurance priv6e A I'gard des
services m~dicaux dispenses par le biais du syst~me
public des soins de sant6. Parmi les questions que le
pr6sent article aborde, citons: Comment de telles
causes se sont-elles insinu6es dans l'appareil
judiciaire? En vertu de quelles conditions de telles
demandes peuvent-elles obtenir gain de cause? Quelle
est l'incidence d'un tel litige sur l'environnement plus
vaste des politiques?
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I. INTRODUCTION
In.November 2004, and again in June 2005, the Supreme Court
of Canada delivered judgments in cases with potentially far-reaching'
implications for Canadian health care- policy.' At issue in Auton v.
British Columbia was whether provincial governments have a
constitutional obligation to deliver an expensive form of autism
treatment within their publicly funded health care regimes; at issue in
Chaoulli v. Ouebec was whether those same governments are
constitutionally permitted to prohibit private insurance coverage for
services provided through the public health care system. In contrast to
previous health care cases decided by the Court, these cases involved
basic issues of health policy rather than peripheral (even if important)
questions of implementation. At stake in Auton was provincial policy
discretion over the range of services provided through the public system,
while Chaoulli represented a challenge to the very existence of publicly
provided health care by attacking the effective provincial monopoly over
the. provision of core medical services.
Auton and Chaoulli are the most visible manifestations of an
increasingly common phenomenon in Canada: the use of rights-based
litigation as an instrument of health policy reform.' Among the key
'Auton v. Brtish Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 [Auton]; Chaoulli v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 [Chaoull].
' Martha Jackman, "The Regulation of Private Health Care Under the Canada Health Act
and the Canadian Charter' (1995) 6:2 Const. Forum 54; Martha Jackman, "The Right to
Participate in Health Care and Health Resource Allocation Decisions Under Section 7 of the
Canadian Charter" (1995/96) 4 Health L. Rev. 3; Canada, Commission on the Future of Health
Care in Canada, Health and the Distribution of Powers in Canada, Discussion Paper No. 2 by
Andr6 Braen (Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002)
(Commissioner: Roy J. Romanow, Q.C.); Canada, Commission on the Future of Health Care in
Canada, The Implications of Section 7 of the Charter for Health Care Spending in Canada,
Discussion Paper No. 31 by Martha Jackman (Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health Care
in Canada, 2002) (Commissioner: Roy J. Romanow, Q.C.) [Jackman, Implications of Section 2];
Canada, Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, How Will the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and Evolving Jurisprudence Affect Health Care Costs, Discussion Paper No. 20 by
Donna Greschner (Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002)
(Commissioner: Roy J. Romanow, Q.C.); and Christopher Manfredi & Antonia Maioni, "Courts
and Health Policy: Judicial Policy Making and Publicly Funded Health Care in Canada" (2002) 27
J. Health Pol. 211.
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issues litigated under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms' are
physician-supply management, medical practice regulation, hospital
restructuring, and regulation and provision of specific treatment and
services. Prior to 2004, the Court's contribution to this phenomenon
included nullifying the federal abortion law,4 modifying professional
advertising regulations,5 upholding the criminal prohibition against
assisted suicide,6 and establishing a constitutional right to sign language
interpretation in the provision of health care services.7
The judicialization of health policy in the form of constitutional
rights claims highlights important questions about a cluster of related
phenomena that falls under the rubric of "legal mobilization." These
phenomena include the "process by which legal norms are invoked to
regulate behavior";' the translation of desires into demands through "an
assertion of one's rights";9 and a "planned effort to influence the course
of judicial policy development to achieve a particular policy goal."' As a
strategy for policy reform, legal mobilization ideally aims at establishing
new legal rules that generate desirable policy consequences and
strengthen the political position of the reform's advocates. Reality,
however, is usually more complicated. Legal mobilization may fail to
establish sought-after legal rule changes, yet desirable policy
consequences may follow; desirable rules may emerge from litigation,
but have no impact on policy or social conditions; unsuccessful legal
mobilization may nevertheless strengthen a policy reform movement by
energizing individuals around particular causes; by contrast, successful
mobilization may enervate a movement or energize a counter-
movement.
' Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
'R. v. Morgentaler, [19881 1 S.C.R. 30.
' Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232.
6 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.
7Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 [Eldridge].
' Richard 0. Lempert, "Mobilizing Private Law: An Introductory Essay" (1976) 11 Law &
Soc'y Rev. 173.
u Frances Kahn Zemans, "Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the
Political System" (1983) 77 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 690 at 700.
o Susan E. Lawrence, The Poor in Court.- The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court
Decision-Making(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 40.
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Chaoulli and Auton are interesting examples of legal
mobilization for several reasons. First, health care is arguably the single
most important area of Canadian public policy: it consumes almost 10
per cent of GDP and is the largest single-expenditure item in provincial
budgets. Second, the cases offer differing visions of the direction health
policy should take-Chaoulli sought to expand private provision while
Auton sought to expand public coverage. Finally, one case involved an
individual lone crusader (Chaoulh), and the other a group with roots in
an organized social movement (Auton). Consequently, both cases
provide a good empirical base for exploring three key questions about
legal mobilization: How do such cases get into the judicial system?
Under what conditions are such claims likely to be successful? What is
the impact of winning-or losing-on the broader policy environment?
In a previous article, we discussed these questions with respect
to Auton.' In this paper, we turn to Chaoulh4 whose legal history has at
least two similarities to Auton. First, as in Auton, the Court reversed the
unanimous judgments of lower appellate and trial courts. Second, again
as in Auton, the Court reversed the judgments below not so much
because of differences of legal interpretation (although this was
important), but because of different interpretations of empirical
evidence. in the pages that follow, we explore both of these
characteristics in greater depth.
II. LITIGATING A PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE TO A PUBLIC
MONOPOLY
Chaoulli entered the judicial process as a twin challenge to the
effective public monopoly on the provision of basic medical services in
Quebec. Part of the challenge came from George Zeliotis, who filed a
constitutional complaint against Quebec's prohibition on the sale and
purchase of private insurance for health services provided through the
public system. The other part of the challenge came from Doctor
Jacques Chaoulli, whose broader complaint included a right to liberty
claim against legislative restrictions on the ability of physicians to
practice simultaneously in the private and public health sectors. The
basic litigation objective of both challenges was a remedy under section
" Christopher P. Manfredi & Antonia Maioni, "Reversal of Fortune: Litigating Health
Care Reform in Auton v. British Columbia" (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 111.
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52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 2 invalidating the impugned legislative
provisions.
In view of this objective, we adopt as a framework for analysis
Philip Cooper's model of remedial decree litigation, which consists of
trigger, liability, remedy, and post-decree phases.13 The trigger phase of
remedial decree litigation includes both the general historical practices
and the specific triggering events that lead to the initiation of a case.
The liability and remedy phases, in which rights violations are
determined and remedies formulated to correct the violations,
constitute the central components of remedial decree litigation. These
phases may occur simultaneously or be the subject of separate
proceedings. The final step in remedial decree litigation is the post-
decree phase, during which remedies are implemented, evaluated and
refined. This phase is characterized by interaction between litigants and
judges, with the degree of judicial involvement being related to the
extent of the constitutional violation, the organizational capacity for
change, and the surrounding political culture. With this model providing
our framework, we explore three key questions: How did these issues
get into the legal process? Why did the claims fail in the lower courts?
Why did they succeed in the Supreme Court?
A. Triggering Litigation
In 1993, sixty-one year old George Zeliotis, a salesman for a
chemical company, suffered several medical problems, including
depression and a heart attack. In 1994, he began experiencing recurring
hip problems, which led him to consult with a variety of medical
practitioners. His general practitioner referred him to an orthopedic
specialist in 1995, and he had surgery performed on his left hip. In 1997,
after some delay, his right hip was operated on. During his year-long
wait in 1996, Zeliotis investigated whether he could pay privately for
surgery and discovered that the terms of Quebec's health care laws
prohibited him from either obtaining private insurance or from paying
directly for services provided by a physician in a public hospital. He
"2 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982(U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
I3 Phillip J. Cooper, Hard Judicial Choices: Federal District Court Judges and State and
Local Officials (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) at 16-24.
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pleaded his case with administrators, politicians, and the local media
without success.
Although it was Zeliotis's condition and waiting time for surgery
that eventually led to litigation, the key protagonist in the judicial battle
became Doctor Jacques Chaoulli, who one observer portrayed as
"preparing and fighting this case almost single-handedly." 4 Trained in
France and Quebec, Chaoulli received his permit to practice medicine
in Quebec in 1986. Then, as now, physicians were required to practice
outside "over serviced" urban areas, such as greater Montreal, or
receive lower reimbursement rates for their services. Chaoulli decided
to return to Montreal after only two years. He soon became well-known
in medical circles through his attempts to set up a home-based, 24-hour
practice for doctors making house calls in Montreal's south shore
region. After intense lobbying of government officials and the Regional
Health Board's refusal to recognize his practice in 1996, Chaoulli began
a hunger strike to draw attention to the situation. The strike lasted three
weeks, and at that point Chaoulli decided to become a "non-
participating" doctor in the Quebec health care system. 5
In Quebec, as in all provinces, physicians may "opt out" of the
public system and bill patients directly for services rendered. However,
as Chaoulli soon discovered, the disincentives for opting out are very
high. Under the terms of Quebec's health care laws, patients may not
seek reimbursement from the public system if they consult non-
participating doctors; in addition, these doctors may not provide private
services in publicly-funded hospitals. 6 From 1996 to 1998, Chaoulli
attempted to gain permission, from both Quebec officials and the
federal ministry of health, to create a private hospital. After this
initiative failed, Chaoulli returned to the public system and worked as a
general practitioner in a walk-in clinic.
Chaoulli was never Zeliotis's physician, but the two plaintiffs
effectively "teamed up" in their legal challenge of Quebec health and
14 Susan Pinker, "'Why Does Such a Big Issue Rest on the Shoulders of Two Citizens?' FP
Asks After Losing Private Medicine Battle" (2000) 162 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1348 [Pinker, "Private
Medicine Battle"].
'- Barbara Sibbald, "In Your Face: A New Wave of Militant Doctors Lashes Out" (1998)
158 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1505.
16 Colleen M. Flood & Tom Archibald, "The Illegality of Private Health Care in Canada"
(2001) 164 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 825.
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hospital insurance laws before the province's Superior Court. In 1997,
they presented motions for a declaratory judgment that two articles of
these laws were unconstitutional. First, they asked the court to
invalidate Article 15 of the Quebec Health Insurance Act,17 which
proscribes private insurers from covering publicly-funded services."8
Second, they asked the courts to invalidate Article 11 of the Quebec
Hospital Insurance Act 9 which prevents non-participating physicians
from contracting for services in publicly funded hospitals."0
Chaoulli chose to represent himself in the initial trial, claiming
that he had a "duty" to provide services, and he called upon several
high-profile critics of public health care to testify on his behalf. Zeliotis,
who stated that his personal goal was to ensure that any future surgery
would not be "delayed again," retained the services of Philippe Trudel,
of Trudel & Johnston.2 This Montreal law firm, which specializes in
constitutional litigation, consumer protection, and health and medical
liability, was also associated with a high-profile class action suit in the
late 1990s against the tobacco industry on behalf of Quebec smokers
and ex-smokers who became addicted to nicotine." Both Zeliotis and
Chaoulli resorted to litigation because of dissatisfaction with the health
policy status quo. In Zeliotis's case, this dissatisfaction appears to have
been triggered by his specific negative experience of waiting for hip
surgery. Chaoulli's dissatisfaction appears to have been the product of a
long-standing normative objection to public management and control of
health care delivery. In addition, the two cases emerged during a period
of tremendous stress in the Quebec health care system, as the province
I7 R.S.Q. c. A-29.
" The relevant portion of Article 15 reads: "No person shall make or renew a contract of
insurance or make a payment under a contract of insurance under which an insured service is
furnished or under which all or part of the cost of such a service is paid to a resident or temporary
resident of Qu6bec or to another person on his behalf."
'9 R.S.Q. c. A-28.
20 The relevant portion of Article 11(1) reads: "No one shall make or renew, or make a
payment under a contract under which (a) a resident is to be provided with or to be reimbursed for
the cost of any hospital service that is one of the insured services; [or] (b) payment is conditional
upon the hospitalization of a resident."
2) Susan Pinker, "The Chaoulli Case: One-Tier Medicine Goes on Trial in Quebec" (1999)
161 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1305-06.
2 Jos6e Hamelin, "L'industrie freine les recours collectifs qufb6cois" Info-Tabac 46
(August 2003), online: Info-tabac.ca <http://www.arrete.qc.ca/bu1146/recours.htm>.
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was implementing a major program of restructuring necessitated by
significant fiscal pressures.
B. Liability Proceedings.- The Ouebec Phase
Trial proceedings in Chaoulli c. Oudbec23 began in December
1997 and continued over four weeks before Justice Ginette Pich6 in the
Superior Court of Quebec. At trial, the basic question was this: is the
combination of waiting times for health care services in the public
system and restrictions on private insurance for publicly provided
services a violation of the right to life, liberty, and security of the person
enshrined in section 7 the Charter?
The court heard testimony from both Chaoulli and Zeliotis, the
physicians who had cared for Zeliotis, a former minister of health in
Quebec, and several physicians and health policy specialists. The court
also heard testimony from Barry Stein, a Montreal lawyer who had
initiated successful proceedings against the Quebec government for
reimbursement of cancer treatment he received in New York after
having had his surgery cancelled at a Quebec hospital.
Chaoulli emphasized the mental anguish he experienced as a
victim of an allegedly discriminatory law that prohibited him from.
practising his profession as a non-participating doctor outside the public
system, and he portrayed Quebec's health care monopoly as infused
with Marxist-Leninist theories of egalitarian ideology. His testimony was
so dramatic and intense that the judge commented on his "tireless"
efforts.24 Zeliotis's counsel, meanwhile, focused on how Article 11 of the
Hospital Insurance Act and Article 15 of the Health Insurance Act were
contrary to the Charter under section 7 (life, liberty, and security of the
person) and section 15 (equal treatment) because they did not allow
non-participating Quebec doctors to use public hospital facilities or
allow Quebec residents to use their own financial resources to insure
themselves for private care."
The court heard the testimony of five medical specialists. Doctor
Eric Lenczner and Doctor C6me Fortin expressed concern with the
problems of access to timely care in orthopaedic surgery and cataract
2 Chaoullic. Qu6bec(Procureuregdnrale), [2000] R.J.Q. 786 [Chaoulli(2000)].
24 Pinker, "Private Medicine Battle," supra note 14.
2 Chaoulli (2000), supra note 23 at 790.
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surgery. Although waiting lists were not fatal, they claimed, they could
seriously reduce the quality of life of patients in the interim. Doctor
Abendour Nabid, meanwhile, argued that there could not be any
reasonable delay for cancer patients. Although all of the physicians
expressed frustration with the health care system in Quebec, there was
no consensus that the system should be changed in the way in which the
plaintiffs were demanding.2 6 Barry Stein also testified about his
problems with waiting for surgery, although the testimony was
contradicted by his physician, Doctor Andr6 Roy, who told the court
that the delay for the surgery had not been expected to be more than
one week in duration.27
The highest profile witness was undoubtedly Claude
Castonguay, the provincial Minister of Health and Social Services
during the early 1970s, considered the "father of medicare" in Quebec.
He claimed that, while he still agreed with the objective of the 1970 law
to ensure equal access to health care, the province's strained financial
situation and growing elderly population meant that new solutions and
partnerships had to be created in the health care system. Nevertheless,
he disagreed with the remedy suggested by the plaintiffs in the case.28
The court also heard the opinions of several "experts" in the
health care sector, who provided historical and comparative perspectives
on the Quebec health care system. Doctor Fernand Turcotte, a
professor of medicine at Laval University, testified about the historical
impetus for public health care and the relationship between access to
health care and socio-economic status.29 Doctor Howard Bergman,
director of geriatrics at the Jewish General Hospital in Montreal, agreed
that patients were unsettled by the rapid changes in the health care
system, but deplored privatization as a solution, suggesting that it would
benefit only the "healthy" and the "wealthy."3 Doctor Charles Wright, a
British Columbia surgeon, commented on the administrative efficacy of
the single-payer system in Canada, while Jean-Louis Denis, a professor
of health system organization at the University of Montreal, pointed out
26 Ibid. at 791.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. at 791-92.
9 Ibid. at 792.
30 ibid.
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that rationing is necessary in every health care system, either through
need, as in Quebec, or the ability to pay, as in the United States.3
Theodore Marmor, a professor of public policy at Yale University, was
asked about the likely impact of a parallel private system in Canada, and
his opinion was that the "undesirable side effects" would include
decreased support in the public system and increased costs of care and
administration.32 The last expert witness was Doctor Edwin Coffey, a
retired obstetrician-gynecologist and research associate for the
Montreal Economic Institute-a conservative think tank that advocates
privatization of health care in Canada.33 His lengthy testimony deplored
the "ideological and politically driven myths" in health care.34
Justice Pich6 delivered her judgment on 25 February 2000, and
her treatment of the plaintiffs in Chaoulliwas unsympathetic. She began
her summary by remarking: "Let's say it from the start: in light of Mr.
Zeliotis' testimony and an examination of his medical record, it is
apparent that he did not really suffer all of the misfortune and delay that
he claims in his deposition."35 As for Chaoulli, she questioned his
motivation, pointed to contradictions in his testimony, and deplored his
use of the court in a personal "crusade" against the Quebec health care
system.36 Although the Justice emphasized that the court had to take
into account all sides of the expert testimony, she concluded that Coffey
was very much a "lone ranger" in his heavy-handed criticism of the
shortcomings of the Quebec health care system.37
Justice Pich6's central legal analysis concerned the claims
relating to the right to life, liberty, and security of the person under
section 7 of the Charter.38 She concluded that access to health care is
indeed a right, since "without access to the health care system, it would
1 Ibid. at 792-93.
32 Ibid. at 793.
I3 Coffey and Chaoulli later co-authored a research paper on "universal private choice."
See Edwin Coffey & Jacques Chaoulli, "Universal Private Choice: Medicare Plus" 2d ed.,
(Montreal: Montreal Economic Institute, 2001).
4 Chaoulli (2000), supra note 23 at 793-94 [translated by author].
3 5Ibid. at 791 [translated by author].
.76 Ibid.
3 7 Ibid. at 793-94.
s' For a review, see Martha Jackman, "Misdiagnosis or Cure? Charter Review of the
Health Care System" in Colleen Flood, ed., The Frontiers of Fairness- Who Decides What Is In
and Out of Medicare (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) [forthcoming in 2006].
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be illusory to believe that the rights to life and security are respected,"39
but she also pointed out that there exists no right to determine the
"provenance" (or source) of that care.4" On the question of whether the
existing limits on private insurance coverage were in violation of these
same rights, the Justice affirmed that these restrictions could limit an
individual's timely access to care, but that such limitations would only
contravene life, liberty, and security of the person if the public system
could not guarantee access to similar care. The Justice was careful to
point out that even though these limitations existed and could be a
"threat," this was not in conflict with the principles of fundamental
justice and therefore could not be considered to contravene section 7 of
the Charter.41
The use of the principles of fundamental justice to defend the
public health care system was a central feature of the legal analysis that
portrayed limitations on any individual right to private insurance as
necessary to protect the collective rights of the entire population.4" In
effect, Justice Pich6 argued that although Quebec's health care laws
constrained economic rights, this prevention of "discrimination based on
one's ability to pay does not violate the values of the charter."43 Justice
Pich6 referred at length to expert testimony that compared the
efficiency and access to care offered by public and private health care
systems, and cited at length Professor Marmor's description of the
negative impact of a parallel system of private insurance on the viability
of the public system.'
Justice Pich6 nevertheless concluded her analysis with a
remarkable observation: she pointed out that while the health care
system in Quebec was based on sound principles, there was evidently
need for some change. However, she declared that this question was
political, rather than legal. In effect, Justice Pich6 argued that health
care reform was the responsibility of legisfators, not judges: "[T]he
Court notes that solutions to problems of the health care system are not
-' Chaoulli (2000), supra note 23 at 822 [translated by author].
40 Ibid. at 823.
41 Ibid. at 832.
42 Greschner, supra note 2 at 11.
43 Pinker, "Private Medicine Battle," supra note 14 at 1348.
44 Jackman, Implications of Section 7 supra note 2 at 6.
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to be found on the legal side., 4 5 Her decision was interpreted as a strong
defence of the existing health care legislation's restrictions on private
insurance and private care. Although recognizing a right to receive
health care, her decision did not recognize a right to receive privately
contracted services.
Chaoulli and Zeliotis were convinced, however, that by losing
the battle, they "had a chance to win the war, 416 because Pich6 had
agreed that the limitations on private insurance could constitute a
violation of the Charter under section 7. They appealed to the Quebec
Court of Appeal in November 2001. Chaoulli again represented himself,
but changed his tactics slightly by arguing that the "excessive"
limitations on private delivery and insurance in Quebec's health care
legislation could be remedied by allowing less restrictive regulations
based on European examples. The strategy was to show that parallel
private systems did not necessarily jeopardize the public system, as had
been argued by experts in the trial proceedings on the basis of U.S.
experience.
The appellate court delivered its judgment on 22 April 2002.
The three justices, Delisle, Forget, and Brossard, again examined
whether the impugned sections of Quebec's health care laws (1) were
ultra vires provincial jurisdiction, (2) violated section 15 equality rights
under the Charter, and (3) violated section 7 rights to life, liberty, and
security of the person. The three justices upheld Justice Pich6's
decisions on each of these questions in their judgments. Justice Delisle
made an important contribution by emphasizing the broadened
definition of the right to access to care, and agreed with the Superior
Court that although the health care legislation constituted a prima facie
limitation of section 7 rights, this limitation was not inconsistent with the
principles of fundamental justice. He also argued that while the right to
enter into a private contract is prohibited by Quebec's health care
legislation, this remains an economic right, and is not "fundamental to
the life of the person." Furthermore, he declared that the violation of
section 7 rights had to be immediate and real, which was not evident in
the case at hand. Justice Delisle also invoked an earlier Supreme Court
s Chaoulli (2000), supra note 23 at 833.
4 Pinker, "Private Medicine Battle," supra note 14 at 1348.
4
7 Chaoulli c. Qudbec (Procureurg6nra, [2002] R.J.Q. 1205 at 1211.
260 [VOL. 44, NO. 2
The Last Line of Defence
decision in reminding the appellants that the Charter was not an
instrument to remedy "societal choices" in the public domain. In other
.words, as Justice Pich6 had argued, the courts cannot be expected to
meddle too far in the realm of legislative responsibility. Justice Forget
concurred with Justice Delisle on the basic principles of fundamental
justice, while Justice Brossard agreed on the distinction between
economic and fundamental rights in this case.
C. Liability Proceedings. The Supreme Court Phase
Zeliotis and Chaoulli persisted in their legal battle and applied
for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which the Court granted in
May 2003. By this time, the scope and stakes of the case had expanded
significantly from a "lone crusade" to a fundamental question about the
legality of restrictions on private health care in Canada. The Chaoulli
case attracted interventions from several third parties, including: five
other provinces (Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia, New Brunswick,
and Saskatchewan); interest groups committed to protecting the public
health care system by maintaining restrictions on private insurance (e.g.
the Canadian Labour Congress and the Canadian Health Coalition,
representing labour groups, consumer groups, and segments of the
community of health care professionals); organizations and businesses
with a direct economic stake in the Court's decision; and professional
associations like the Canadian Medical Association, the Canadian
Orthopaedic Association, and the British Columbia Anesthesiologists'
Society. In addition, Chaoulli attracted a highly unusual intervention
from ex-Senators.
In 2002, two public reports presented the results of exhaustive
studies of the state of health care in Canada. The Commission on the
Future of Health Care in Canada (known as the Romanow Commission,
after its director, former Saskatchewan social-democratic premier Roy
Romanow) published a vigorous defence of public health care against
privatization, and its recommendations had been widely acclaimed by
public interest groups." The Senate Standing Committee on Social
Affairs, Science and Technology (known as the Kirby Committee, after
48 Canada, Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Building on Values. The
Future of Health Care in Canada: Final Report (Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health
Care in Canada, 2002).
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its chair, the Conservative Senator Michael Kirby) also produced a six-
volume report that, while also a defence of the merits of the public
health care system, suggested that there might be a better mix of public
and private concerns in the delivery of health care.49 Also relevant to the
Chaoullicase, the Kirby Committee recommended a "Care Guarantee"
to establish a maximum waiting time for each treatment or procedure,
after which time the provincial government would have to make that
service available by other means (such as funding treatment provided
elsewhere).
The hearing in Chaoullibegan with questions directed at Doctor
Chaoulli by Justices Bastarache and Deschamps, who focused on the
"socially undesirable" consequences of private services on access to
health care as a whole.5" Chaoulli, representing himself once more,
framed his answer in terms of how the "deficiencies" of the health care
system were leading to "discord" between federal and provincial
governments. He referred to countries such as Australia and Sweden
that he claimed allowed for parallel private health care. He also cited
Friedrich Hayek in arguing that freedom of contract is a right protected
by section 7 of the Charter.
Philippe Trudel again represented Zeliotis, and asked the
Justices whether the state could prohibit Canadians from using their
own resources to buy care that they need when the public system is
unable to provide it in a timely fashion because of inadequate resources.
He was quizzed by Justice Binnie as to whether the existing means being
employed to protect public health care were "grossly disproportionate"
to that aim, but stood firm on the point that the Court's responsibility
was to focus on the rights of the individual at hand rather than the
integrity of the public system. Bruce Johnston, also representing
Zeliotis, argued that more money was needed in the health care system,
4 Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science. and Technology,
The Health of Canadians - The Federal Role: Final Report, vol. 6 (Ottawa: Standing Senate
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 2002).
"0Sources for this testimony include the author's notes from the Supreme Court of Canada
proceedings on 8 June 2004; CTV News, transcript (8 June 2004); Dennis Bueckert, "Private
health-care system would undermine quality of medicare: lawyer" Canadian Press (8 June 2004)
(eC); and Matt Borsellino, "Future of health care at stake in Chaoulli-Zeliotis legal case" (2004)
40:25 The Medical Post 2. Two Justices, Louise Arbour and Frank lacobucci, had announced their
intention to leave the Cohrt and therefore did not participate in the deliberations.
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and that individuals should be allowed to inject that money even if
governments were unwilling to do so.
Zeliotis's case was supported by submissions on behalf of
Cambie Surgeries, whose counsel claimed that the health care system
was in "desperate" shape but that the waiting list problem could be
easily solved by a readily available, parallel system of access to private
care. With somewhat more nuance, Earl Cherniak, representing the
Kirby Committee, agreed that the health care system was in dire straits,
but also insisted that there was a constitutional obligation for
governments to deliver necessary services to their residents, preferably
through a "health care guarantee" enforced by the federal government.
The Canadian Medical Association (CMA), vigorously reminding
the Court of the physicians' obligation to "advocate for life, all life,"
supported this view on timely care, and reiterated that governments
must provide a timeliness guarantee or stop promising that they can
deliver such care. Guy Pratte, the CMA's counsel, urged an Eldridge-type
remedy in this case, in which the Court should mandate provincial
governments to remedy their health care legislation to conform to care
guarantees, but suspend any declaration of unconstitutionality to allow
the governments to explore alternative means of meeting this obligation,
The Justices were persistent in their questioning, but understood
the broad implications of the case. Four of the justices were particularly
sharp in questioning representatives of the governments in the
courtroom, all of whom cautioned the Court not to get involved in the
policy issues at hand. Justices Bastarache and LeBel seemed
unconvinced by Quebec's assertion that Zeliotis's experience was an
isolated incident and that the delays in care are often due to patient
decisions rather than system failures. Justice Major grilled Jean-Marc
Aubry on the federal government's insistence that private services would
have harmful effects on the public system, while Justice Binnie
expressed exasperation at the Ontario government's conclusion that
services must be rationed in order to control costs, and that a two-tiered
health care system would not solve the waiting list problem. In her
argument on behalf of the Canadian Health Coalition, Martha Jackman,
a legal scholar widely known for her analyses of health care and the
Charter, reminded the Court of the distinction between private care
(which is available) and private insurance (which is prohibited by
Quebec and other provincial legislation).
It took exactly one year-until 9 June 2005-for the Court to
deliver its judgment in Chaoulli As in Auton, it reversed the lower court
2006]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
decisions, but this time with very different consequences. The Court was
also more divided than in Auton, with seven justices rendering three
separate judgments. Like Justice Pich6 in the trial court, Justices Binnie
and LeBel, writing in dissent with Justice Fish, argued that the question
at issue in Chaoulliwas not one that could "be resolved as a matter of
law by judges."'" In their view, there is no "constitutionally manageable
standard" for determining what constitutes "reasonable" access to
health care services.52 Moreover, even if such a standard did exist, the
dissenting justices saw no reason, either as a matter of fact or law, to
reverse the lower court decisions. On the factual question, they accepted
the lower court finding that "a two-tier health care system would likely
have a negative impact on the integrity, functioning and viability of the
public system."53 On the legal issue, although recognizing that the
meaning of section 7 of the Canadian Charter has been expanded, they
noted that this challenge did not "arise out of an adjudicative context or
one involving the administration of justice."54 Consequenily, it did not
engage even a broad interpretation of section 7.
Despite this strong dissent, a majority of the Court reversed the
lower court judgments and found in favour of Zeliotis and Chaoulli.
According to Justice Deschamps, the existence of lengthy waiting lists
for certain surgical procedures affected the rights to life and personal
inviolability protected under section 1 of the Quebec Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms (which has quasi-constitutional status) in a 'way
that could not be justified under section 9.1 of the same document.
Justice Deschamps rejected both the alleged micro- and macro-level
consequences of eliminating the public monopoly on health care
provision. She indicated that "no study ... produced or discussed" at
trial supported the conclusion that the availability of private insurance
would have perverse consequences on individual behaviour in the
51 Chaoullt, supra note 1 at 861.
52 Ibid.
3 Ibid. at 871.
54 Ibid. at 877.
' Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12 [Quebec CharterS. Section 1 of
the Quebec Charter provides that: "Every human being has a right to life, and to personal security,
inviolability and freedom. He also possesses juridical personality." Section 9.1 provides that: "In
exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for
democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Quebec. In this
respect, the scope of the rights and freedoms, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed by law."
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system,56 nor did she find adequate evidence that private insurance
would lead to increased costs or a general deterioration of the public
system.57 To the contrary, she cited the experience of other OECD
countries as evidence that "a number of measures are available ... to
protect the integrity of Quebec's health care plan" even with private
insurance.58
In choosing to base her decision on the Quelbec Charter rather
than the Canadian Charter, Justice Deschamps departed significantly
from the issues that engaged the attention of the judges below her as
well as the parties before the Court. None of the lower court judgments
had discussed the Quebec Charter, none of the twelve constitutional
questions formulated by Justice Major for the Court on 15 August 2003
dealt with the Quebec Charter, and, contrary to the impression given by
Justice Deschamps,59 only four brief paragraphs of the Zeliotis factum
raised arguments based on the Quebec Charter.
Chief Justice McLachlin, with Justices Major and Bastarache,
agreed with Justice Deschamps on the Quebec Charter issue, but went
further in declaring that the prohibition was also invalid under section 7
of the Canadian Charter. According to the Chief Justice, "access to a
waiting list is not access to health care," so that
prohibiting health insurance that would permit ordinary Canadians to access health care,
in circumstances where the government is failing to deliver health care in a reasonable
manner, thereby increasing the risk of complications and death, interferes with life and
security of the person as protected by s. 7 of the Charter.'
D. Remedy and Post-Decree Phases
The result of these judgments was that Quebec's ban on private
insurance for publicly provided services was invalidated by a 4-3 margin.
Since a majority of the Court did not reach this decision on Charter
grounds, the decision did not have immediate legal impact outside of
Quebec. In the absence of any significant discussion of potential
6 Chaoulh supra note 1 at 829.
5
7 Ibid. at 828.
5 8 Ibid at 836.
5 9 Ibid. at 809.
60 Ibid. at 850.
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remedies in written submissions or oral arguments before the Court, the
majority simply exercised its authority under section 52 of the
Constitution Act, 198261 to declare the impugned provision "of no force
or effect." This placed the Quebec government in a difficult situation,
and it filed a motion with the Court on 28 June 2005 asking for the
judgment to be suspended for a period of eighteen months so the
government could analyze its impact and design measures to respond
appropriately.
In seeking to have the judgment suspended, Quebec raised
several issues that it had neglected to discuss during the Court
proceedings themselves. These included the real concern of citizens and
social groups about the future of the public system, and the way in which
the rising costs of care and difficult choices are associated with the
organization and administration of the health care system on the
ground. In addition, Quebec's motion alluded to the potential
consequences that opening up private markets might have for trade
relations, and particularly for Canada's relations under NAFTA, where a
grandfather clause applies only to existing social legislation. Ironically,
given the heated federal-provincial disputes over health care and the
fact that the Supreme Court decision constitutes a bold move by a
national political institution into the realm of provincial jurisdiction, the
Quebec government pointed out that operationalizing the Chaoulli
decision required careful examination of how it could be managed
within the parameters of the Canada Health Act.62 These arguments
proved partially persuasive, and on 4 August 2005, the Court granted
the province's motion for a partial rehearing and suspended its
judgment for twelve months (retroactive to 9 June 2005).
However, even as the immediate legal impact of Chaoulli was
suspended, the post-decree political manoeuvering accelerated. The
signals from Quebec Premier Jean Charest made it unlikely that his
government would invoke the notwithstanding clause in this case. In
September 2005 the Quebec Minister of Health and Social Services;
Philippe Couillard, pointed out that Quebec could draw lessons from
the private-public mix in European countries such as France and the
U.K. Although the government was expected to present a white paper,
61 Supra note 12.
62 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6.
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or preliminary bill, by December 2005, in order to allow sufficient time
for legislative hearings and public consultations, this schedule was
pushed back due to the start of the general election, since health care
reform would be an obvious electoral issue. Nevertheless, it is widely
assumed that the bill will allow Quebeckers to purchase private
insurance for core services now covered under the public health care
regime. The conundrum for the Quebec government is how to
implement this major change while ensuring that the public system
remains viable. It must consider such operational issues as allowing
doctors to provide both publicly and privately insured services, and
imposing quotas to ensure that health care professionals provide a
certain minimum amount of service in the public system.
Regardless of how the Court ultimately resolves the remedial
issues in Chaouli4 the decision has acquired a separate political life.63
The implications of Chaoulli for the health care system in Canada are
potentially important in that the ban on private insurance has been the
essential brake to the development of a parallel private delivery system:
without insurance, few individuals would be able to pay for such
services, and few health care professionals would be attracted to provide
them. But the effective impact of the decision will not be felt until the
Quebec government implements its policy changes, and until we can see
whether and how similar cases make their way through other provincial
courts.
III. ANALYSIS
The Chaoulli litigation represents a classic instance of policy-
oriented legal mobilization. Dissatisfaction with the policy status quo
manifested itself as a specific constitutional rights claim in favour of a
single alternative policy: access to private health insurance. This
challenge then raised complex empirical questions about the future
impact of the desired policy change, which involved the link between
waiting lists and a public health care monopoly, and the long-term
impact of a parallel private health care system on the viability of a
63 See Peter H. Russell, "Chaoulli The Political versus the Legal Life of a Judicial
Decision" in Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to
Justice- The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2005) 5.
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universal and comprehensive public system. One advantage of
examining questions like these through litigation is that concrete cases
may identify operational flaws in legislation. However, in this instance
neither Chaoulli's nor Zeliotis's complaints provided a particularly good
foundation for challenging the status quo. There was no evidence that
Zeliotis himself would have been better off without the prohibition, or
even that he had failed to receive "health care services" that were
"reasonable as to both quality and timeliness."' Chaoulli's complaint
was not even really about waiting lists, but. about his philosophical
opposition to state interference with his freedom to practice medicine as
he wished. Consequently, although Zeliotis presented a plausible and
sympathetic section 7 claim, his case lacked evidence of actual harm.
Similarly, although Chaoulli could demonstrate real harm by virtue of
his having received administrative penalties for violating regulations, his
case presented an unpalatable section 7 claim premised principally on
freedom of contract. It is therefore unsurprising that the case failed in
the lower courts.
Why, then, did it succeed in the Supreme Court? Perhaps the
most important factor was a flurry of activity in the health policy field in
2002. In May 2002 the C.D. Howe Institute published a report by
Stanley Hartt and Patrick Monahan entitled "The Charter and Health
Care. 65 According to Hartt and Monahan, existing section 7
jurisprudence meant that "[g]overnments cannot tell Canadians that
they are required to obtain medically necessary services exclusively
through the public health care system and then deny them access to
those services on a timely basis when they are ill." '66 Under conditions of
delayed access to public health care, they continued, "provincial
prohibitions that suppress private medical services are legally
unenforceable. '6 7 Although none of the Chaoulli judgments referred
specifically to this report, in many ways it provided the legal argument
that would ultimately prevail in the case. In fact, Monahan served as co-
counsel for the intervening Senators.
64 Chaoull supra note 1 at 860.
65 Stanley H. Hartt & Patrick J. Monahan, "The Charter and Health Care: Guaranteeing
Timely Access to Health Care for Canadians" (2002) 164 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary.
66 Ibid. at i.
6 7 Ibid.
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The year 2002 also saw the publication of two different reports
on the state of public health care in Canada: the Romanow and Kirby
reports. Indeed, in an important sense Chaoullican be characterized as
a judicial referendum on the content of these two reports rather than as
a contest between two private individuals and a provincial government.
Fourty-four separate paragraphs of the 278-paragraph judgment contain
references to these two reports. More importantly, the distribution of
these references between the majority and dissenting judgments is
highly suggestive of the reports' influence. References to the Kirby
report outnumber references to the Romanow report by thirteen to
three in the two majority judgments; by contrast, twelve paragraphs of
the dissenting judgment contain references to the Romanow report, and
its sixteen references to the Kirby report are there only to refute the
majority's interpretation of the Senate Committee's findings.
Consider, for example, Chief Justice McLachlin's use of the
Kirby report to compensate for the absence of concrete evidence from
the actual dispute about the relationship between waiting lists and
private insurance in Quebec.68 In her words, the existence of waiting lists
indicated that Quebec was "failing to provide public health care of a
reasonable standard within a reasonable time," thereby "creat[ing]
circumstances that trigger the application of s. 7."69 Under these
circumstances, a measure that "subjects people to long waiting lists"' 70 by
limiting access to "alternative medical care, 71 is unconstitutional.
Therefore, the prohibition against private health insurance infringes
section 7. According to the Chief Justice, removing this prohibition
would improve individual health care outcomes without adversely
affecting collective access to public health care. Similarly, Justice
Deschamps relied on the Kirby report in a key paragraph of her
judgment, explaining why the Court needed to act in this area. "Courts,"
she argued, "have all the necessary tools ... to find a solution to the
problem of waiting lists" and respond to "the urgency of taking concrete
action" in the face of a "situation that continues to deteriorate."
I Chaoulhb supra note 1 at 854-57.
69 ibid. at 844.
70 ibid. at 858.
7' Ibid. at 854.
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Governments "cannot choose to do nothing," and when they do, "courts
are the last line of defence for citizens.,
72
The different fortunes experienced by the Kirby and Romanow
reports in the Court are in contrast to their fortunes in the policy realm.
Indeed, the Romanow report has been clearly favoured by the federal
government, and several recommendations from it are in the process of
being implemented (e.g. multi-year funding to the provinces and
creation of the Health Council). Moreover, despite making "wait lists" a
major issue in the 2004 election campaign, the Liberal party did not
embrace the solutions contained in the Kirby report. In effect, Chaoulli
breathed new life into the Kirby report, which was adopted almost in its
entirety by the Conservative party as the centrepiece of its health care
policy for the 2005-06 election campaign.
IV. CONCLUSION
By the time Chaoulli reached the Supreme Court, it was no
longer about Zeliotis, Chaoulli, and Quebec, but about Romanow and
Kirby. The majority's decision to intervene in the debate between these
two different health care visions is well summed up in Justice
Deschamps's bold cri de coeur that "courts are the last line of defence
for citizens." In this sense, the majority's judgment represents a
paradigmatic case of judicial policy making: it identified a policy
problem (waiting lists), took jurisdiction over the problem through a
broad interpretation of section 7, and then specified a solution through
its remedial power to invalidate the impugned provision.73
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the judgment is the
majority's decision to use the Kirby report-rather than the evidence
presented at trial-as the empirical basis for its diagnosis of the state of
health care policy. Without passing judgment on the report's quality,
there was no opportunity to subject it to the disciplined evaluation that
can take place in the adversarial process. The only opportunity for
external assessment of the report came during a one-day hearing. 4
72 Ibid. at 840.
' Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward J. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State:
How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) at
148.
' The Supreme Court of Canada's hearing of oral arguments on 8 June 2004 in Chaoulh]
supra note 1.
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Legal mobilization for private health care did momentarily lead
to a change in legal rules-at least in Quebec-that may persist when
the Court's suspension of its remedy ends in June 2006. Whether this
legal change-if it persists-will produce the desired policy change by
reducing waiting times for certain medical procedures is an open
question. However, it is probably the case that Chaoulli has energized
proponents of a greater role for the private health care sector while
putting advocates of the pre-Chaoullistatus quo on the defensive.

